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At the time of writing, Louisiana has the third highest COVID-19 infection per capita in the
United States. The state government issued a stay-at-home order effective March 23rd. We analyze
the projected spread of COVID-19 in Louisiana without including the effects of the stay-at-home
order. We predict that a large fraction of the state population would be infected without the
mitigation efforts, and would certainly overwhelm the capacity of Louisiana health care system. We
further predict the outcomes with different degrees of reduction in the infection rate. More than
70% of reduction is required to cap the number of infected to under one million.
I. INTRODUCTION
The identification and verification of human-to-human
transmission of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) in
early January of 2020 in Wuhan, China triggered the
start of a worldwide pandemic. As of April 5, there are
more than 1.2 million confirmed cases and more than
67,000 deaths attributed to COVID-19. The first case in
the US was confirmed in Washington State on January
20. The number of reported cases until early March was
rather low. The exceedingly slow spreading rate in these
early months may be partially due to the lack of ade-
quate testing, which remains a major issue at the time of
writing. The cases dramatically increased in the USA in
early March, with most cases in the states of Washing-
ton, New York, and California. It was not until March 9
that the first case in Louisiana was identified.
The growth rate of infections in Louisiana has
been alarming since the confirmation of the first case.
Louisiana state government responded swiftly by closing
all K-12 public schools on March 13. On March 16, public
gatherings of more than 50 people were prohibited, and
bars, bowling alleys, casinos, fitness facilities, and movie
theaters were closed. Furthermore, a stay-at-home order
was issued on March 23.
Adequate testing for COVID-19 remains limited in
the USA. For this reason, accurately predicting the tra-
jectory of the spread of COVID-19 by relying on the
number of confirmed cases alone is a rather question-
able approach. While the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered
(SIR) model may well describe the dynamics of the
spreading1,2, accurate predictions rely on knowing the
number of confirmed cases, which is severely hampered
by the limitations of testing. This is particular signifi-
cant in the early stages of the spread of the disease when
the percentage of people tested is very small, and the
spread by infected people who are asymptomatic is very
significant.
Alternatively, the number of fatalities attributed to
COVID-19 may be a more reliable parameter for tracing
the dynamics of the virus spread. Combining this infor-
mation with the mortality rate can be a better strategy
to predict the number of cases than relying on the con-
firmed infection count alone. The goal of this paper is
to extract the dynamics of COVID-19 in Louisiana from
the data of the death count supplemented with the con-
firmed cases. We then run several scenarios with different
reduction of the infection rate and calculate the number
of people infected in each case. We conclude with sug-
gestions to improve the model and, as consequence, its
predictions.
II. MODEL
Our model is based on the Susceptible-Infected-
Recovered (SIR) model3–32 with the modification of in-
cluding the number of quarantined people (Q), as has
been considered elsewhere.3–5 The equations defining the
model are the following:
dS(t)
dt
= −βS(t)I(t)
N
, (1)
dI(t)
dt
= β
S(t)I(t)
N
− (α+ η)I(t), (2)
dQ(t)
dt
= ηI(t)− γQ(t), (3)
dR(t)
dt
= γQ(t) + αI(t), (4)
where N is the total population size, S is the susceptible
population count, I is the unidentified infected popula-
tion count, Q is the number of identified cases, and R
includes the number of recovered and dead patients. The
model is characterized by the following parameters: β is
the infection rate, η is the detection rate, α is the re-
covery rate of asymptomatic people, and γ includes the
recovery rate and the casualty rate of the quarantined
patients. This model is equivalent to the standard SIR
model if we are not interested into differentiating between
Q and R.
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2We further assume that the rate of increase in the num-
ber of casualties is proportional to the number of infected
at the early stage of the epidemic,
dC(t)
dt
= δI(t), (5)
where δ is the mortality rate. This is a good approx-
imation at the beginning of the virus spread when the
number of quarantined patients is a small percentage of
the total population. This equation is not combined in
any way with Eq. 1-4, it is only used to estimate the
model parameters at the start of the epidemic.
III. ANALYSIS
We first consider Eq. 2, assuming the susceptible pop-
ulation count is very close to that of the total popula-
tion, S ∼ N , which is justifiable at the beginning of the
epidemic since only a small fraction of the population
is infected. With this assumption one can decouple the
infected population count from the other parameters to
obtain:3,5
I(t) = I(0) exp [(β − (α+ η))t]. (6)
Solving Eq. 5, the casualty count as a function of time
can be written as
C(t) =
δI(0)
β − (α+ η) exp [(β − (α+ η))t]. (7)
The exponential growth of the number of fatalities
at the beginning of the epidemic should represent the
spreading of COVID-19 reasonably well since the mecha-
nisms for slowing the dynamics, such as improved detec-
tion and social distancing, are delayed in time
By fitting the available fatalities data (see Appendix)
between March 14 and 31 to Eq. 7, the parameters of the
model can be determined. Fig. 1 displays the fit which
provides an estimate of C(t) ≈ 5.04 exp [0.228t]. The
dynamics (exponent) is thus given as β−(α+η) = 0.228.
From the value of the exponent we can estimate the time
for doubling the casualties count: ln(2)/0.228 ≈ 3.04
days. Moreover, the proportionality constant can be used
to estimate the initial number of infections I(0) if the
mortality rate δ is known.
The mortality rate is estimated by combining the ac-
cumulated mortality rate data and the median time be-
tween infection and death. It is estimated that the me-
dian time between infection and the onset of symptoms is
about five days, while the median time between the onset
of symptoms and death is eight days.33–36 It is worth not-
ing that the distribution of these time periods is close to
a log-normal, thus a more sophisticated analysis should
include the effects of the non-self-averaging behavior of
the distribution. Only the median values are used in the
present work.
FIG. 1: COVID-19 casualties in Louisiana, C(t), as a function
of time with March 14 as day 0, data is represented by circles.
The parameters of Eq. 7 are fit to the data, providing an
approximation to the number of deaths as a function of time:
C(t) ≈ 5.04 exp [0.228t].
The accumulated mortality rate is estimated to be
2.3%37. Notably, the mortality rate does indeed vary
by region. This may be due to the rate of testing as
well as the capacity of health care facilities. For ar-
eas in which health care facilities have been overrun,
the death rate would be much higher. Notwithstand-
ing these uncertainties, assuming that the health care
facilities have not yet been overrun, the mortality rate
is estimated to be δ ≈ 0.023
5 + 8
≈ 0.0018. This also pro-
vides an estimation of the number of persons who carries
the virus but not detected at day 0, I(0), which is given
as I(0) ≈ 5.04
δ
× 0.228 ≈ 650. This reveals that even
as early as March 14, the number of infected people is
already at the order of hundreds.
Now we consider the number of confirmed cases at the
start of the epidemic, P (t). This is given by the sum of
Q(t) and R(t) subtracted by the number of persons who
recovered without being tested. The rate of change on the
number of reported cases can be obtained by combining
Eqs. 3 and 4 and subtracting αI(t):
dP (t)
dt
= ηI(t) (8)
with I(t) given by Eq. 6, we obtain:3,5
P (t) ≈ η
β − α− η I(0) exp [0.228t]. (9)
By fitting the number of confirmed cases (Fig.2) we
find P (t) ≈ 117 exp [0.228t], which provides the estimate
η
β − α− η I(0) ≈ 117. Since I(0) and (β − α − η) are
known from fitting to the number of casualties, we find
3FIG. 2: The number of confirmed cases of COVID-19 in
Louisiana, P (t), as a function of time with March 14 as day
0. The data is represented by circles, the red line is the best
fit, P (t) ≈ 117 exp [0.228t]. Note, we only fit the coefficient
in front, the exponent is given by from the death count, see
fig. 1.
η ≈ 117× 0.228650 ≈ 0.041. There remains one parameter to
be determined, the recovery rate of asymptomatic people,
α. Assuming that the average time or recovery or dead
are both 13 days, and half of the infected never show any
symptoms thus they are not been tested39. We can esti-
mate α = 0.5/13 ≈ 0.0385. This is probably the upper
bound of the estimate, in reality this could be smaller.
This additionally provides the value for β as 0.307.
With these parameters, Eqs. 1-4 can be solved and
used to predict the spread of the disease. Fig. 3 displays
the time evolution of the number of unidentified persons
who carry the virus, I(t), the number of persons who
are either in quarantine or recovered, Q(t) + R(t), and
the total number of persons who have ever been infected,
Q(t)+R(t)+I(t). The number of infections but unidenti-
fied, I(t), grows exponentially, as expected from Eq. 6, at
the initial stage, and this behavior continues until about
day 25, when around 100,000 people are infectious. The
exponent of ∼ 0.228 suggests the number of cases double
approximately every three days, which seems to be con-
sistent with the data in many areas of the world before
the mitigation efforts are kicked in. After day 25, the
rate of increase slow down due to the combination of the
decrease on the number of susceptible (uninfected) peo-
ple and the increase on the number of recoveries. The
number of infected cases ceases to grow exponentially,
but rather becomes a stable but constant increases until
peaking at around day 50, corresponding to early May.
On the other hand, the number of quarantined and re-
covered people resembles a logistic function.
To compare with other states which already have
widespread epidemic, we use the described method to
calculate the infection rate (β), the testing rate (η), and
FIG. 3: The number of unidentified but infected peo-
ple, I(t), the number of quarantined and recovered people,
Q(t)+R(t), and the number of people who are ever infected,
Q(t)+R(t)+I(t), as a function of time since March 14. Hori-
zontal dashed line at the total population of Louisiana, 4.65
million.
State β − α− η η R0
Louisiana 0.228 0.041 3.87
Florida 0.198 0.114 2.30
Georgia 0.161 0.054 3.74
Texas 0.206 0.114 2.35
California 0.205 0.083 3.69
Illinois 0.237 0.085 2.92
New Jersey 0.287 0.079 3.44
New York 0.231 0.070 3.13
TABLE I: Table of the value of β − α − η, η, and R0 for
different states. Note that the reproduction number, R0, is in
line with the other studies38.
the reproduction number (R0 = β/(η + α)) of selected
states. Result are displayed in Table I. Note than the
reproduction number of Louisiana is the highest among
the states listed in the table.
Within the present model, there are two major routes
to slow the initial exponential growth of the epidemic,
which is characterized by the parameter β− (α+η). The
first one is to decrease the infection rate, β. The second
route is to increase the testing rate, η. To increase the
recovery rate from unidentified persons, α, can also re-
duce the spread, but it is unlikely to be achieved. As the
stay-at-home order was issued on March 23, it is expected
that the infection rate should be drastically reduced. We
simulate new scenarios with the assumption that social
contact is reduced so that the infection rate decreases by
4FIG. 4: The number of people who are infected and carrying
the virus without being identified, I(t), as a function of time,
with March 14 as day 0. We assume the mitigation efforts
reduce the infection rate by 50 %, 60%, 70%, 80%, and 90%
from day 15 (6 days after the stay-at-home order), and the
sum of the testing rate and recovery rate of asymptomatic
people remains unchanged. The inset is a zoom for the first
50 days.
50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, and 90% starting at day 15. The
results are shown in Fig. 4 and 5.
FIG. 5: The number of people who are ever infected the virus
(log scale), I(t) + Q(t) + R(t), as a function of time, with
March 14 as day 0. We assume the mitigation efforts reduce
the infection rate by 50 %, 60%, 70%, 80%, and 90% from
day 15, and the sum of the testing rate and recovery rate of
asymptomatic people remains unchanged.
We find that there is a substantial drop of the active
virus carriers even with a 50% reduction in the infection
rate. However, the number of people who will be infected
still exceeds one million if the reduction in the infection
rate is smaller than 70%. This suggests the importance
of strict measures in social distancing. Perhaps it also
suggests the importance of wearing basic protective gear
to further reduce the infection rate.
IV. DISCUSSION
There are many uncertainties in this simplified model
which can be improved over time as more data become
available. Improvement can be achieved by including
additional factors, such as correlation with different age
groups, correlation with the health condition of the pop-
ulation, the availability of public health care, the effect
of higher ambient temperature and humidity, and many
others. Some of those factors are likely beyond the SIR
model which implicitly assume that the population is ho-
mogeneous and well mixed, and that infection occurs
without time delay. However, given the rather limited
data available today, it is not clear that more sophisti-
cated models may provide much better predictions.
In spite of the rather simple model being employed
in this analysis, it provides a baseline for the spread of
the COVID-19 in Louisiana in the absence of mitigation
efforts. The situation is clearly dire, as a very large frac-
tion of the population will get infected with a peak on
the number of infections around early May.
With the current mitigation efforts, we expect the in-
fection rate will be greatly reduced. Currently, we do not
have data to support the effectiveness of current mitiga-
tion efforts as the trend still fits rather well to the initial
stage of exponential growth.
The main projection from this work is that more than
70% of reduction in the infection rate is needed to keep
the infected count below one million. Increasing testing
capacity and providing protective gear to further reduce
the infection rate seem to be reasonable measures.
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VI. APPENDIX
Number of people tested for COVID-19, people con-
firmed infected, and the resulting casualty count in
Louisiana from March 14 to March 31 are shown in the
Table II40–42
5Date Tested Confirmed Death
Mar 14 210 77 1
Mar 15 247 103 2
Mar 16 374 136 3
Mar 17 531 196 4
Mar 18 703 280 7
Mar 19 899 392 10
Mar 20 1,931 537 14
Mar 21 3,302 763 20
Mar 22 3,498 837 20
Mar 23 5,948 1,172 34
Mar 24 8,603 1,388 46
Mar 25 11,451 1,795 65
Mar 26 18,299 2,305 83
Mar 27 21,359 2,746 119
Mar 28 25,161 3,315 137
Mar 29 27,871 3,540 151
Mar 30 34,033 4,025 185
Mar 31 38,967 5,237 239
TABLE II: Number of test conducted, number of confirmed
cases, and number of death from Mar 14 to Mar 31 from
COVID-19 in Louisiana.
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